A Law and Order President

 

President Trump’s critics claim that deploying National Guard and regular U.S. military forces to enforce the law in American cities violates civil–military norms, is unconstitutional, and is an irresponsible use of the professional military. But while there may be good reasons to limit the use of the U.S. military in domestic affairs, U.S. troops have been so employed since the beginning of our republic. Indeed, the U.S. Army Historical Center has published three 400-page volumes on the use of federal military forces in domestic affairs.

The authority of the president to use force in response to domestic disorder arises from the Constitution itself. Section 4 of Article IV reads: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”

The fundamental purpose of a republican government is to protect its citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and property. Although the First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” it does not protect riot, arson, and looting.

Under Article II of the Constitution, the president, as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”—and of the militia when under federal control—has the authority to act against enemies both foreign and domestic. In 1792, Congress passed two laws pursuant to its constitutional power “to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”: the Militia Act and the “Calling Forth” Act, which gave the president limited authority to employ the militia in the event of domestic emergencies.

In 1807, at the behest of President Thomas Jefferson—troubled by his inability to use the regular Army as well as the militia to deal with the Aaron Burr conspiracy to establish an independent country within the U.S.—Congress passed the Insurrection Act. Although intended as a tool for suppressing rebellion when circumstances “make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings,” it also enabled the Army to enforce federal laws, not only as a separate force, but also as part of a local posse comitatus (a group conscripted to enforce the law). Accordingly, troops were often used in the antebellum period to enforce fugitive slave laws and suppress domestic violence. In 1854, President Franklin Pierce’s attorney general, Caleb Cushing, issued an opinion that endorsed the legality of using the Army in a posse comitatus:

A marshal of the United States, when opposed in the execution of his duty, by unlawful combinations, has authority to summon the entire able-bodied force of his precinct, as a posse comitatus. The authority comprehends not only bystanders and other citizens generally, but any and all organized armed forces, whether militia of the state, or officers, soldiers, sailors, and marines of the United States.

Troops were used to suppress domestic violence between pro- and anti-slavery factions in “Bloody Kansas,” and federal soldiers and Marines participated in the capture of John Brown at Harpers Ferry in 1859. After the Civil War, the U.S. Army was involved in supporting the Reconstruction governments in the southern states. Presidents invoked the Insurrection Act on five occasions during the 1950s and 1960s to counter resistance to desegregation decrees in the South. And during the Los Angeles riots of 1992, elements of U.S. Army and Marine divisions augmented the California National Guard.

Those who have criticized President Trump for threatening to use the National Guard and possibly the Marines “against the will of state governors” might want to consider what happened when some southern governors refused to execute the 1954 Supreme Court mandate to integrate schools. In 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus deployed his state’s National Guard to defy federal authority by preventing the integration of a high school in Little Rock. President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded by placing the Arkansas National Guard under federal control and deploying soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division to enforce the law. In a letter to Eisenhower, Democrat U.S. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia compared soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division to Hitler’s “storm troopers,” illustrating that the argumendum ad Hitlerem often deployed against Trump is nothing new.

Many today claim that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA) prohibits the use of the military in domestic affairs. But they completely misunderstand that law.

In the election of 1876, President Ulysses S. Grant deployed Army units as a posse comitatus—under the authority of local law enforcement officials—to protect the rights of black citizens and Republicans in general at southern polling places. In that election, Rutherford B. Hayes defeated Samuel Tilden with the disputed electoral votes of South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida. Southerners claimed that the Army had been misused to “rig” that election, which led to the passage of the PCA two years later. But the PCA only prohibits federal troops from being placed under lesser authorities than that of the president. It does not constitute a bar to the use of the military in domestic affairs, and it certainly does not limit the president’s authority as Commander in Chief of the U.S. military.

As John Brinkerhoff, an authority on the use of the military in domestic affairs, wrote in 2002: “The president’s power to use both regulars and militia remained undisturbed by the Posse Comitatus Act.”

Drug Trafficking

Trump’s critics charge him with violating both domestic and international law by using the U.S. military to target drug cartels and drug runners, claiming that his actions are unprecedented. But as far back as the Reagan administration in 1986, U.S. Army infantry and aviation assets operated with Bolivian forces against drug producers in that country. And in 1993, President Bill Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive on Counter-narcotics in the Western Hemisphere, assigning a substantial role in drug interdiction to the military.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 1995 authorized use of military assets in drug interdiction: 14 USC Section 526 authorizes firing on vessels carrying drugs, and 8 USC Section 1189 authorizes the designation of narco-terror groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, unlocking powers used by every administration since 9/11. As for international law, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea authorizes military force against suspected stateless vessels engaged in piracy and slave trafficking, essentially labeling them hostis humani generis, meaning enemies of mankind.

The Trump administration has proceeded in accordance with legal prudence. Admiral Alvin Holsey, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, properly sought legal justification for the strikes on suspected drug boats. Subsequently, the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel advised the Pentagon that the strikes were legal under both U.S. and international law, that all strikes have been conducted in “complete compliance with the law of armed conflict,” and that U.S. troops would not be exposed to prosecution for carrying out the orders. It is legitimate to argue that Trump’s policy regarding these strikes is wrongheaded, but it is not unprecedented. Indeed, his interpretation of what constitutes the boundary of his military authority is historically ordinary.

But what about the lack of congressional approval for the use of force against narco-traffickers? In this regard, Trump’s policy is comparable to the Obama administration’s war in Libya and extensive drone attacks, the Biden administration’s attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen, and indeed, going way back, President Jefferson’s attack on the Barbary Pirates. All these were undertaken without congressional approval. Trump’s actions in the Caribbean are well within U.S. political norms.

Is Trump the dictator he is accused of being?

Trump isn't a dictator. He's a wrench in the machine that real dictators built. While global elites tighten control through media, money, and tech, he's using their own system to expose and collapse it from within. He didn't seize power. He was fairly elected by a majority. He is, however, shattering their illusion of power.

They call him dangerous... not because he's breaking laws, but because he's breaking control loops. This isn't tyranny. It's the most strategic rebellion against tyranny we've seen in our lifetime.

A dictator, by contrast, silences opposition, expands state control over life, controls media to suppress dissent, uses fear to maintain obedience, consolidates power and never lets go. Trump hasn't ever silenced his opposition. He has taken relentless criticism from media institutions, even his own party. He reduced regulations, not for more control, but to allow more freedom in business and innovation. He was banned from social media – he was not the one doing the banning. He returned power to the states during covid rather than forcing nationwide mandates. He walked away from power peacefully in 2020, even under pressure and despite deep disagreement with a questionable election process.

Trump's actions aren't about seizing control... they're about exposing control. He's using economic, legal, and geopolitical moves to apply pressure on globalist networks who hijacked sovereignty through trade, tech, and centralized finance, forcing corrupt players to reveal themselves by pushing them into reaction, negotiating from strength, not submission, using tariffs, sanctions, and alliances as leverage, not dominance, shifting power dynamics without collapsing the system, forcing realignment instead of full destruction.

The bigger issue is that this isn't just about politics. It's about resetting the board. Trump is operating inside the system, but he is not of it. He's using its rules to expose its weakness and create openings for decentralization, innovation, and sovereignty to rise. That's not dictatorship. That's disruption on a level that most people still don't fully see yet.

by Mackubin Thomas Owens at imprimus.hillsdale.edu, December 2025 | Vol. 54, #12 and @NowPammsy on X on January 5, 2026